Brazil to analyze wage determinants and compare results to Abowd et al. (2001) for French and U.S. manufacturing. While returns to human capital in Brazilian manufacturing exceed those of the other countries, occupation and gender differentials are similar. The worker-characteristics component accounts for much of the greater wage inequality in Brazil, but the establishment-fixed component has scant explanatory power. Thus, firmor industry-level factors offer little scope for explaining the differences in wage inequality. Brazil's wage structure resembles that of France, a country with some similarity in labor market institutions.
I. Introduction
T HE structure of wages is a topic of central importance in labor and development economics. Empirical research has tied wages closely to individual worker characteristics, including human capital and gender, and has shown that industry-and firm-level characteristics play important roles. Earnings inequality has been broadly linked to these factors.
To avoid potentially serious omitted variable bias, recent work on wage structure has utilized linked employeremployee panel data, which admit a full range of workerand firm-level controls. Considerable progress has been made in exploiting such data sets to assess aspects of wage structure in industrialized countries. 1 Due to data limitations, however, far less attention has been paid to developing countries. 2 This has restricted the evaluation of wage determination theories beyond the context of industrialized economies. Moreover, many issues in labor market policy relate to the wage structure. In particular, the relatively high wage inequality in developing countries is difficult to evaluate in the absence of cross-country information on wage structure determinants.
This paper examines the relationship between earnings, worker characteristics, and firm characteristics in a developing country. We employ an extensive linked employeremployee data set for Brazil that is directly comparable to data sets for France and the United States, as studied by Abowd et al. (2001) . The data quality enables us to analyze compensation determinants, controlling for employer-fixed effects and detailed firm and worker characteristics. As far as we are aware, we report the first direct comparison of this kind between developing and industrialized countries.
We draw on Brazil's establishment-worker data set Relação Anual de Informações Sociais, or RAIS. This is an annual record of workers formally employed in any sector (agriculture, commerce, construction, manufacturing, utilities, services, and public), with demographic information for individual workers, along with establishment identifiers. Beyond prior studies for developing countries, we estimate composite establishment-level fixed effects for a cross section of formally employed workers, and thereby capture unobserved establishment-average worker characteristics along with unobserved establishment characteristics. This allows us to evaluate the relationships between wages and observable worker characteristics, controlling for otherwise unmeasured effects.
Our primary purpose is to contrast the wage structure in Brazilian manufacturing in 1990 with that of France in 1992 and the United States in 1990, as evaluated by Abowd et al. (2001) . Our data permit the adoption of those authors' exact statistical specification. The chosen reference year predates the implementation of Brazil's extensive procompetitive reforms in the early 1990s, thus limiting the role of transition effects. To assess robustness, we also provide a set of results for 1997, a year that follows the transition period. 3 We restrict our analysis to São Paulo state, the most economically advanced Brazilian state, as well as the manufacturing center of the country. Given its similarity to mid-income developing countries, São Paulo state provides a useful comparison of industrialized-versus developingcountry wage determinants. 4 Our data capture the wage structure in the formal labor market. As a robustness check, we assess potential selectivity bias by predicting worker selection into our sample using complementary household data.
While past studies have compared returns to human capital in developing versus industrialized countries, ours is the first to provide a direct comparison based on linked employer-employee data. In line with traditional studies, we find that wage premia associated with human capital measures are far higher in Brazil than in France and the United States. A typical male manufacturing worker in Brazil with a college degree receives wages that are 150% higher than a comparable worker with some high school education. This premium stands at 70% in the United States, and in France it is only 40%. We also find that returns to experience among men are considerably greater in Brazil. Because we include establishment effects, these comparisons are robust to workforce sorting based on human capital and to unmeasured workforce characteristics (such as average ability) at the establishment level. On the other hand, we find that wage differentials based on occupation and gender are strikingly similar across the three countries.
Brazilian earnings inequality, as measured by the standard deviation of log wages, is 44% higher than in the United States, and 90% higher than in France. Our estimated worker characteristics and establishment-fixed components of individual wages shed light on the overall importance of individual-versus establishment-level factors in explaining this difference. In all three countries, the predicted wages of manufacturing workers based on their observable characteristics play a dominant role in total compensation-amounting to between one-half and three-quarters of overall manufacturing wage variability. Establishment-fixed effects, in contrast, have relatively little importance in explaining Brazilian wages, in comparison to the other countries. Correspondingly, the variability of residual earnings, after controlling for worker and establishment characteristics, is much greater in Brazilian manufacturing. 5 It follows that Brazil's relatively high wage inequality cannot be traced to establishment-level factors, including industry-and firm-level variables. To the contrary, workerlevel factors, both observable and unobservable, account for the cross-country differences in earnings inequality. This finding has direct implications for theoretical models of wage determination, and renders employer-related explanations of wage dispersion relatively less important.
We further consider the relationships between firm characteristics and wages, using the manufacturing survey PIA (Pesquisa Industrial Anual), which provides firm-level input, output, and performance measures. Firm identifiers in the RAIS and PIA data sets permit the linking of firm-and worker-level observations. We show that firm-average predicted worker characteristics and establishment-fixed components of wages, based on our estimates, each relate positively and significantly to firm size, capital intensity, occupational skill intensity, and workforce productivity in Brazilian manufacturing. Both workforce composition and unmeasured establishment-specific factors are important in explaining the higher wages paid by large, capital-and skill-intensive, and highly productive firms. The relationships between wages and firm characteristics are similar for Brazil and France, while the United States differs in important respects.
To assess the robustness of our results to the choice of sector, we replicate our analysis for three nonmanufacturing sectors-services, commerce, and agriculture-in 1990. Broadly speaking, the services and commerce sectors are similar to manufacturing regarding the relation between wages and individual characteristics, and the relative importance of the worker-characteristics and establishmentfixed components. In agriculture, however, the returns to human capital are smaller, and the establishment-fixed component is significantly more important. Thus, the agriculture sector, while small, demonstrates important differences with respect to wage determination.
The paper proceeds as follows. We discuss our main data sources RAIS (for worker and establishment information) and PIA (for manufacturing firm information) in section II, along with a complementary but not linkable household survey used for selection correction. Section III describes the statistical models. Section IV presents results on Brazil's manufacturing wage structure in 1990 and 1997, and compares findings to France in 1992 and the United States in 1990. Section V reports a reestimation of Brazil's manufacturing wage structure controlling for formal-job selectivity, verifying the robustness of the results. Connections between firm characteristics and wage components are investigated in section VI. For the year 1990, section VII provides a comparison between manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors. An extended discussion is offered in section VIII, and section IX concludes.
II. Data
We use comprehensive individual worker data with information on earnings, demographic characteristics, and occupations, along with establishment ID codes for the place of work. From a separate source we obtain data on manufacturing firms that describe numerous firm-level characteristics. Firm-identifying establishment IDs from the worker data set make it possible to link the worker and firm observations. To verify that our results are not affected by country as a whole. Forty-one percent of Brazil's manufacturing value added in the 1990s originated in São Paulo state, making the state highly representative of Brazilian manufacturing overall. São Paulo state is home to 22% of the Brazilian population and a third of all formal-sector workers. 5 We inspect whether selection of Brazilian workers into formal employment induces a detectable bias in the log wage component estimates for Brazil. Under the assumption of jointly normally distributed formality selection disturbances and log wage residuals, we find no such evidence.
worker selectivity into formal employment, we obtain outof-sample predictions of employment status from a separate household survey.
A. Worker Data
Our individual worker data derive from the labor force records RAIS (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais of the Brazilian labor ministry MTE). By Brazilian law, every private-or public-sector employer must report detailed worker and job information to RAIS every year. 6 A job observation in RAIS is uniquely identified by worker ID, the employer's establishment ID, and dates of job accession and separation. The establishment ID makes it possible to control for unobservable establishment and average-workforce effects in explaining the wage structure. For every worker, we keep the observation with the highestpaying job on December 31st. In the available version of RAIS, workers' ages are reported in terms of eight age ranges. We exclude workers in the two highest ranges (50 years and older) to avoid potential confounding effects stemming from workers who leave the labor force prior to the official retirement age. We restrict attention to workers employed in São Paulo state in four private sectors (agriculture, commerce, manufacturing, and services) for the years 1990 and 1997. The resulting samples consist of 5.89 million workers in 1990 and 6.37 million in 1997.
RAIS reports compensation as the monthly average wage, expressed in multiples of the current minimum wage. We use the log of annual wages as our earnings measure, defined as the reported monthly wage times the December U.S. dollar equivalent of the current minimum wage times 12. See appendix A for further details concerning the compensation measure.
We use the reported age ranges jointly with the nine reported education categories to obtain a proxy for potential labor force experience. For example, a typical Early Career worker (34.5 years of age) who is also a Middle School Dropout (left school at 11 years of age) is assigned 23.5 years of potential labor force experience. Our education variable regroups the nine education categories included in RAIS to correspond to the categories considered by Abowd et al. (2001) . 7 Appendix A provides further details on the construction of our education and experience variables.
Occupational classifications in RAIS follow the CBO (Classificação Brasileira de Ocupações). To make this system comparable to standard international classifications, we mapped the CBO for 1994 into the commonly used ISCO-88 (International Standard Classification of Occupations, Muendler et al. 2004 ). The ISCO-88 reclassifications are in turn mapped into five broad occupational categories (professional and managerial, technical and supervisory, other white collar, skill-intensive blue collar, and other blue collar). These correspond to the categories that Abowd et al. (2001) use. 8 Table 1 indicates the sectoral employment shares within the 1990 and 1997 samples. Agriculture represents less than 5% of the totals in both years, while manufacturing and services each account for about 40% of the sample in 1990. For manufacturing, the employment share falls to less than 30% in 1997, while rising to 50% for services. Table 1 also reports mean annual wages for selected demographic groups by sector and year, along with employment shares within sector. On average, manufacturing provides the highest level of earnings for males, and services provides the highest level for females. Males earn an unconditional wage premium in all sectors and years. Table 1 also indicates that workers with some college education earn a substantial unconditional premium in all sectors and years. The same holds true for workers in white collar occupations (professional and managerial, technical and supervisory, and other white collar), except for commerce in 1997, where wages across the two occupation groupings are nearly equal. Males make up the bulk of workers in agriculture and manufacturing, while females account for a substantial proportion of employment in commerce and services. Outside of services, the vast majority of workers have no college education. Blue collar occupations predominate in agriculture and manufacturing, and white collar occupations comprise most of employment in commerce and services. Appendix D provides complete lists with summary statistics of RAIS variables used in the paper.
B. Firm Data
For the firm-level data, we use the manufacturing survey PIA (Pesquisa Industrial Anual from IBGE, the Brazilian census bureau) for 1990 and 1997. The data are a random sample of all but the smallest manufacturing firms. PIA 6 RAIS primarily provides information to a federal wage supplement program (Abono Salarial), by which every worker with formal employment during the calendar year receives the equivalent of a monthly minimum wage. RAIS records are then shared across government agencies. An employer's failure to report complete workforce information can, in principle, result in fines proportional to the workforce size, but fines are rarely issued. In practice, workers and employers have strong incentives to ascertain complete RAIS records because payment of the annual public wage supplement is exclusively based on RAIS. The ministry of labor estimates that well above 90% of all formally employed workers in Brazil were covered in RAIS throughout the 1990s. Data collection is typically concluded by March following the year of observation. 7 The correspondence is imprecise in only one respect: the French and U.S. data allow Abowd et al. (2001) to distinguish between undergraduate and graduate degree attainment, while the RAIS combines these two categories. Our education indicator variables therefore distinguish four levels of schooling. "College Graduate" corresponds to the "Completed College" and "Completed Post-Graduate Degree" levels in Abowd et al. (2001) . 8 Brazil's CBO-94 generally provides classifications at a finer level of detail than does ISCO-88. The level of detail in the Brazilian system permits the reclassifications needed for transforming the more professionbased Brazilian classifications into the more skill-based international classifications. For a small number of 1990 observations, RAIS includes CBO codes that are not used in CBO-94. We set these to "Miscellaneous" within the relevant subcategory.
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includes a wide range of input, output, and performance measures. 9 IBGE's publication rules allow data from PIA to be withdrawn in the form of tabulations of cells having at least three firms. We construct cells using three-firm random combinations drawn from within each Nível 50 sector, calendar year, and location (metropolitan São Paulo city or rural). The Nível 50 sectors consist of 31 manufacturing sectors, corresponding roughly to the two-digit SIC sectors in the United States. A single four-or five-firm cell is defined within a sector when the number of firms in the sector is not divisible by three. For each three-to-five-firm cell, we calculate the number of firms as well as the sum, mean, and standard deviation of the relevant PIA variables. While the observations are aggregated, we retain the firm identifiers behind each newly created composite observation, permitting the linking of RAIS workers to the composite observations. This procedure yields samples of 1,169 and 679 linked cells for 1990 and 1997, respectively. We provide details on the linking in appendix B.
C. Complementary Household Survey Data
The widely used Brazilian household survey PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios) provides separate and complementary information on informal and formal employment. We relegate a discussion of PNAD variable definitions, and a brief comparison with RAIS, to appendix C.
III. Statistical Models

A. Individual Wages
The availability of establishment information in our worker data set allows us to include an establishment variable in our wage regressions. Following Abowd et al. (2001) , we model individual compensation in a given year as
9 In PIA (Pesquisa Industrial Anual), the Brazilian statistical bureau IBGE surveys mining and manufacturing firms for the years 1986 to 1990, and from 1992 to present. We use observations for the years 1990 and 1997. In 1986, a firm qualified for PIA if at least half of its revenues stemmed from mining or manufacturing activity, and the starting sample was taken from three strata: (i) the population of the roughly eight hundred largest Brazilian manufacturers with sales in 1985 corresponding to at least 200 million 1995-BRL (1995-USD); (ii) a random sample of mediumsize firms with annual output in 1985 above 100,000 1995-BRL; more than 6,900 firms make it into PIA this way; (iii) the nonrandom selection of newly founded firms with annual average employment of at least one hundred persons; around 1,800 such entrants are included in PIA until 1993. A firm that enters PIA through one of these three strata remains in the sample until legal extinction. Any affiliate, spinoff, or firm otherwise related to a sample firm enters PIA. Sampling changes in 1996 to represent all mining and manufacturing firms with more than ten employees, but no capital stock figures are reported since. Therefore, the data set of this paper only includes firms in 1997 that are also present in PIA in at least one year prior to 1996. Their capital stock is inferred with a perpetual inventory method. 
where j is the pure establishment effect and ␣ j is the average of pure worker effects ␣ i over workers employed at establishment j. The establishment effect controls for unobservable worker and establishment characteristics. show that omitting this effect leads to bias in the estimation of ␤ in general.
B. Selectivity
Informal employment is not covered in RAIS. To remove potential bias from formal work status selectivity in equation (1), we assess work status selection based on identical worker characteristics x i measured in the household data. We model selection as
where is a parameter vector. The coefficient vectors ␤ and are estimated under two sets of structural assumptions. First, we assume joint normality of the errors ε i and i . Second, under the assumption that h(x i , ) is a nonlinear function of x i , contrary to x i ␤, we estimate an analog to the nonparametric Das, Newey, and Vella (2003) model.
C. Firm Characteristics
For the firm-level analysis, the predicted wage component due to worker characteristics, x i ␤ , as well as the predicted establishment-fixed component, j , are linked to firms and aggregated to firm-level averages k and x k ␤ . We then relate these firm-level components of individual compensation to firm-level variables q k according to
where ␥ 1 and ␥ 2 are parameters to be estimated, s is a sector effect, s ϭ S(k) is the Nível 50 manufacturing sector in which firm k operates, and k is an error term.
IV. Individual Wage Structure in Manufacturing
Our specification of the individual compensation model (1) uses potential worker experience and indicator variables for gender, education, and occupation as measures of individual characteristics. Quadratic, cubic, and quartic terms for potential experience are included. Gender is interacted with all other variables. 
A. Wages and Worker Characteristics in Brazil
To facilitate the interpretation of earnings components, table 3 summarizes the wage differentials for education, occupation, and gender implied by table 2 estimates. As regards education, Brazilian manufacturing workers with some college education earn almost twice as much on average as high school graduates, and college graduates earn two-and-a-half times as much. The profiles of education differentials for men and women display striking similarity, and change little between 1990 and 1997.
With respect to occupations, relative wages in Brazil rise for both men and women as occupations increase in skill intensity. Professional and managerial workers, for example, earn over twice as much as non-skill-intensive bluecollar workers. The profile is steeper for men. Male skillintensive blue-collar workers earn a premium of nearly 30% relative to their non-skill-intensive blue-collar counterparts, while among women the wages of all blue-collar workers are roughly similar. Differences in the occupational returns between 1990 and 1997 are very small. Figure 1 displays average wages by years of experience for male and female workers, as derived from the table 2 estimates. For both sexes, wages in Brazilian manufacturing rise with experience throughout the range of years considered, with returns to experience being much higher for males but relatively less steep in 1997 than in 1990. 11
B. Comparison with France and the United States
Our wage structure estimates for Brazil can be directly contrasted with the findings of Abowd et al. (2001) for France and the United States, given the comparability of our variable definitions and econometric specification. Figure 1 and table 3 report the estimated experience-wage profiles and education, occupation, and gender differentials for all three countries. For men, the experience profile is steeper in Brazil than in the United States, and much steeper than in France. A similar pattern holds with respect to education premia, where the returns to college for Brazilian men are dramatically higher than for either French or American men.
In general, measured returns to human capital acquisition by men are highest in Brazil and lowest in France.
Women present a different picture. As figure 1 shows, the experience profile for Brazilian women is much flatter than for men. Returns to experience for women in Brazil are below those in the United States, while still being above those in France. Thus, while women earn lower compensation for experience relative to men in all three countries, the gap is far larger in Brazil. Similar to France and the United States, women receive higher college premia in Brazil than men. Excepting the relatively small earnings increase from primary school to high school education for women in manufacturing, women realize higher returns to human capital acquisition relative to men in all three countries.
The results also reveal a striking similarity between occupation differentials in Brazil and France for both sexes. For Brazil, the male occupation profile by skill is slightly steeper than for France, while the female occupation profiles in Brazil and France are very similar in 1990 and close in 1997. U.S. occupation premia are much lower and exhibit a larger wage premium for skill-intensive blue-collar occupations than for other (non-skill-intensive) white-collar occupations.
The remaining gender gap in wages-conditional on experience, education, and occupation differences between genders-is less pronounced in Brazil than in France and closer to U.S. manufacturing. The overall Brazilian female/ male wage ratio of around 90% lies very near the U.S. figure and markedly above the level of 80% in France.
In summary, Brazil's earnings pattern in manufacturing resembles that of the United States more closely in experience, education, and gender, while occupational premia in Brazil and France are quite similar.
C. Components of Individual Wages
We next assess the overall explanatory power of the estimated worker characteristics and establishment-fixed components of individual wages, given by x i ␤ and j , respectively. The worker-characteristics component represents the predicted wages of a worker with observed characteristics x i , conditioning on his or her place of work. As discussed above, the establishment-fixed component captures both establishmentaverage pure worker effects and pure establishment effects, so it reflects predicted wages based on the establishment mean of unobserved worker characteristics together with unobserved establishment characteristics. Finally, the residual component of wages captures worker-level wage determinants that remain after controlling for worker characteristics and establishmentfixed effects. To ensure comparability with Abowd et al. (2001) , we exclude education variables and compute wage components from a reestimated model. 12 As a consequence, the effect of education on wages is subsumed into the residual component. Table 4 assesses the importance of the components in explaining wages. Column 1 of the table reports the means of log wages and the two wage components for the three countries expressed in 1990 U.S. dollars, and for Brazil in 1997 expressed in 1997 U.S. dollars. Standard deviations are given in column 2, and the remaining columns indicate simple correlations between log wages, the wage components, and the regression residuals. Observe that the standard deviation of log wages for Brazil in 1990 exceeds that of France and the U.S. by 90% and 44%, respectively, indicating substantially greater earnings inequality in Brazil.
In all three countries, the predicted wages of workers based on their observable characteristics play an important role in determining total compensation. For Brazil, the variability of the worker-characteristics components in 1990 and 1997, measured by standard deviation, amounts to 62.5% and 56.7%, respectively, of the variability of log wages. Moreover, worker characteristics have high explanatory power, as exhibited by the high correlations between the workercharacteristics components and log wages across the four cases. Arguably, these figures understate the importance of worker characteristics, since education has been subsumed into the residual component.
In contrast, the establishment-fixed component is much less important for Brazil. The variability of this component amounts to 25.9% of total wage variability in 1990, and 34.3% in 1997. The corresponding percentages for France and the United States are 41.6 and 48.9, respectively. The establishment-fixed component also has lower explanatory power in Brazil, as indicated by the relatively low correlations between the components and log wages in Brazil (0.358 and 0.435) versus France and the United States (0.581 and 0.610). Unmeasured characteristics at the establishment level appear to explain substantially less of the variation in log wages in Brazil relative to France and the United States. 13 13 These results are broadly consistent with the general finding that worker effects dominate firm effects in explaining wages. provide a review of the numerous studies establishing the relative importance of worker effects. Comparing the establishment-fixed components shows the extent to which establishment-level factors can explain the relatively greater earnings inequality in Brazil. Importantly, the standard deviations of the Brazilian establishmentfixed components in 1990 and 1997 (0.203 and 0.267) are closely comparable in magnitude to the corresponding values for France and the United States (0.172 and 0.266). Thus, explanatory variables based on establishment cannot account for the differences in overall wage variability. We return to the importance of this finding in the discussion in section VIII.
Finally, the two wage components considered jointly have lower explanatory power in Brazil. Comparing the goodness of fit R 2 (within) values in table 2 relative to France and the United States, Brazilian wages display much greater unexplained variability.
D. Decomposition of Wage Inequality
We inquire further as to how the establishment-fixed and worker-characteristics components contribute to log wage inequality in Brazilian manufacturing. 14 The individual earnings model (1) decomposes log wages into mutually exclusive additive components. Shorrocks (1982) shows that, under plausible invariance axioms, the unique decomposition of any inequality index is proportional to the additive decomposition of the squared coefficient of variation. 15 Table 5 reports the Shorrocks (1982) decomposition of log annual wage inequality into its components. For this purpose, we include education in the wage regressions. Worker characteristics account for around half of wage inequality in both years. The unexplained residual in log wages, however, accounts for almost as much of log wage inequality as do observed worker characteristics.
Recall that the estimated establishment-fixed effect combines a pure establishment effect with the establishment average of pure worker effects. This combined establishmentfixed effect accounts for only about 10% of total log wage inequality. Omitting the establishment-fixed effect in straight OLS regressions induces a slight increase in the contribution of worker characteristics to log wage inequality of around 3 percentage points. This effect is tiny, and the estimates of returns to experience and education, the premia on occupations, and the gender differential hardly change when establishment-fixed effects are removed. 16 The establishment-fixed effect reduces the residual component in log wage inequality, and accounts for no more than a fifth of otherwise unexplained residual variability. So, unob- served worker heterogeneity is behind the bulk of unexplained earnings inequality in Brazil.
V. Formal Work Status Selectivity
A. Selection into Formality
In the Brazilian manufacturing sector, informal workers constitute 22% and 35% of the workforce in 1990 and 1997, respectively. We inspect whether selection of workers into formal work status affects estimates of the individual earnings model (1) for Brazil. For this purpose, we make use of the PNAD household data. Occupational reporting is less reliable in the household data, so we discern only between blue-collar and white-collar jobs. To improve fit, we distinguish nine levels of educational attainment. The categories are identically defined in the PNAD household and the RAIS labor force data.
Let selection into formal employment be modeled as in equation (3): worker i is formally employed iff h(x i , ) ϩ i Ͼ 0. Conditional on presence in the RAIS census, expected compensation (1) becomes
where I i ϭ 1 indicates formal status. We use regressors x i common to both the household and the RAIS data sets for prediction of h(x i , ) in RAIS, based on household-data estimates of . Two sets of structural assumptions are considered. 17 First, in the spirit of Heckman's (1979) two-stage parametric procedure, we estimate formality selection using a probit model on the household data. The errors ε i and i are assumed to be jointly normally distributed, and we adopt the simplification h(x i , ) ϭ x i . The selection probability is given by the cumulative normal distribution at x i , P(I i ϭ 1͉x i ) ϭ ⌽(x i ). It follows that ␤ in equation (5) is identified, and the least squares estimator is unbiased, after inclusion of the predicted inverse of Mills ratio as regressor (Heckman, 1979) .
To implement the parametric procedure, we first obtain estimates of the selection coefficients for 1990 and 1997 from PNAD, using PNAD variables that coincide with RAIS variables. We find that the probability of formal work status significantly increases with education and experience, while occupation and gender have no statistically significant effect. We take the coefficient estimates for an out-of-sample prediction of the inverse of Mills ratio for every worker in the RAIS census of formal employment. Finally, we include the predicted inverse of Mills ratio in our individual compensation model (5) to gauge the bearing of formality selection on the compensation estimates. Table 6 reveals that returns to education, occupation premia, and gender differences, for both 1990 and 1997, are essentially unaffected by the parametric correction (columns 1 and 2, as well as 4 and 5). 18 Findings are similar for experience premia and components of individual wages.
Second, as a further robustness check, we make the alternative assumption that h(x i , ) is a nonlinear function of x i , whereas x i ␤ involves no higher-order interactions, and estimate the so-restricted semiparametric analog to the nonparametric Das et al. (2003) model. 19 In particular, we estimate the propensity score of formality status with a polynomial expansion of continuous variables up to fourth order and the full set of indicator variable interactions (excluding the blue-collar indicator from higher-order interactions). 20 In the compensation equation, we use the propensity score and its square (which are both statistically significant) to approximate the nonzero disturbance expectation.
As seen in table 6, the semiparametric correction has only a tiny effect on estimated returns to education, occupation premia, and gender differences for both years. The experience premia and wage components are similarly unaffected. We conclude that our findings are robust to formal sector selectivity. 17 The regressor sets x i in equation (1) and in the selection condition h(x i , ) ϩ i Ͼ 0 coincide unless there are worker characteristics that predict formality, but do not correlate with compensation. We have no evidence for the existence of such instruments. 18 In a similar vein, Carneiro and Henley (1998) find no significant bearing of the informal sector's size on Brazilian real wages in a shortterm model of wage determination. 19 In our application, identification requires restricting the parametric part of the compensation equation to lower-order interactions. This introduces potential specification error. We thus view our semiparametric version of the Das et al. (2003) model merely as a robustness check of Heckman (1979) correction.
20 Leave-one-out cross validation shows this polynomial expansion to exhibit superior fit, with an average squared prediction error up to 6% below lower-order approximations and 4% below the minimum-error specification with blue-collar indicators. We choose polynomial estimation after finding the semiparametric Klein and Spady (1993) estimator to exhibit problematic convergence behavior. 
B. Wage Effects of Formality Selection
Under the parametric Heckman (1979) correction, the coefficients on the inverse Mills ratio capture the covariance between the error term in the selection equation and the error term in the individual compensation model. Our RAIS estimates are Ϫ0.259 in 1990 and Ϫ0.137 in 1997, with standard errors of 0.122 and 0.037, respectively. These negative and statistically significant correlations between the two error terms indicate that workers whose unobserved characteristics raise the probability of informal employment receive higher wage compensation in their formal jobs, all else equal. In other words, the informal sector exerts a slight upward pressure on formal-job wages for workers who are more likely to find employment in the informal sector.
VI. Wage Components and Firm Characteristics
We draw on the linked RAIS-PIA sample to relate the firm-average worker characteristics and establishment-fixed components of individual wages to the characteristics of manufacturing firms. The firm characteristics model (4) estimates partial correlations between selected firm characteristics and the two wage components. This allows us to assess what may be predicted about firm characteristics from one wage component, controlling for the other component. We consider five measures of inputs and three measures of productivity at the firm level, corresponding to the variables analyzed by Abowd et al. (2001) . Results for Brazil in 1990 and 1997, along with France in 1992 and the United States in 1990, are reported in table 7.
As seen in column 1 of table 7, the size of Brazilian manufacturing firms, measured in terms of total employment, exhibits a mild positive correlation with both of the wage components in 1990. An increase of 1% in the characteristics-predicted wage levels of a firm's workers, holding constant the predicted wages of its establishments, is associated with a nearly 1.2% increase in firm size, while a 1% increase in the predicted wage levels of a firm's establishments, holding constant its characteristics-predicted worker wages, implies an increase in size that approaches 1.5%. Both firm-average wage components relate positively with total capital stock, with the wage elasticities of capital stock being in excess of 2%. Correspondingly, high-wage manufacturing firms, measured with respect to either of the wage components, tend to be more capital intensive.
Comparing Brazil to France, the correlations of employment and capital stock with the worker-characteristics component of wages are quite similar, but employment and capital stock have much stronger positive correlations with the establishment-fixed component in France. Controlling for predicted wages due to average worker characteristics, firms with high-wage establishments are much more likely to be large and capital intensive in France. For the United States, in contrast, high predicted worker wages are associ- ated with smaller firms, and the relationship with capital intensity is only slightly positive. The establishment-fixed component relates positively to firm size and capital stock in the United States, but the partial correlations are much smaller than in Brazil and France. Thus, the link between input characteristics and the wage structure of firms, particularly as predicted by average worker characteristics, differs sharply between Brazil and France, on one hand, and the United States, on the other. The link between wage components and occupational structure is considered in two ways, consistent with the differing French and U.S. measures used by Abowd et al. (2001) . The variable "High-Skill Occupation Ratio" (corresponding to the French measure) is defined as professional and managerial plus technical and supervisory employment, divided by total employment, using the skill categories from RAIS. The "Non-Production Worker Ratio," in contrast, divides white-collar workers by the sum of white-and blue-collar workers, where the data are drawn from PIA. Across occupation variables and countries, occupational skill intensity relates positively to predicted worker wages, as expected. The association between skill intensity and predicted establishment wages is positive for Brazil, but much smaller for the other countries, suggesting that the establishment-fixed earnings component in Brazil is more responsive to workforce composition.
Worker productivity, based on either value added per employee or sales per employee, exhibits positive correlation with both wage components in all three countries. In Brazil, firms with high values of either wage component are especially likely to have highly productive workers, as measured by value added. The relationship is much weaker with respect to the sales measure, however. The two productivity measures produce nearly identical results for France and the United States, with the relationship being more strongly positive in France. The results do not establish any significant relationship between return on capital and the wage components in any of the countries. Productivity gains for firms with high-wage workers or high-wage establishments appear to offset the higher wage costs.
Finally, the estimated relationships for 1997 are broadly consistent with those of 1990, with the exception that the relationships between wage components and the capital stock variables become significantly smaller in 1997.
VII. Sectoral Comparisons
The sectoral scope of RAIS permits a wage analysis beyond manufacturing. including the education variable, in computing the wage components. We choose the year 1990 for sectoral comparisons. 21
A. Wages and Worker Characteristics
The profiles of experience premia for men and women in 1990 are shown in figure 2. Experience profiles in services and commerce for both sexes are close to each other, but below those in manufacturing for males while above those in manufacturing for females. The experience profiles are 21 Results do not markedly differ between 1990 and 1997, except for declining returns to experience in the manufacturing sector, which we discussed in section IV, and a widening gender gap in the services sector between 1990 and 1997. Male Workers
Female Workers
Source: RAIS São Paulo state 1990 (prime-age workers in their highest-paying job). Wage levels relative to zero experience wage levels from wage component estimates (table 8) .
the lowest in agriculture for both sexes. Table 9 does not reveal major discrepencies in education, occupation, and gender differentials across sectors. Thus, our basic findings concerning the relation between wages and worker characteristics hold across the four sectors. There are, however, some differences worth noting. Table 9 shows that returns to education are somewhat lower in the nonmanufacturing sectors, save for college-educated men in commerce and agriculture.
Occupational premia exhibit interesting cross-sectoral differences. For services, the technical and supervisory occupations receive wages that are closer to professional and managerial levels than in other sectors. For commerce, in contrast, the occupation profile is relatively flat up to the professional and managerial level, where it takes a sharp upward jump. At the other end of the scale, skill-intensive blue-collar occupations receive substantial premia for men in manufacturing and commerce, and for women in services. Table 10 evaluates the explanatory power of the predicted worker characteristics and establishment-fixed components of wages across sectors. Total wage variability in manufacturing and services exceeds that in commerce and especially in agriculture. Except for agriculture, the sectors remain highly unequal relative to the manufacturing sectors in France and the United States. The standard deviations of the worker characteristics and establishment-fixed components relative to the standard deviation of log wages are roughly comparable in manufacturing, services, and commerce, as are the correlations between the two components and log wages. Thus, for these three sectors, worker characteristics play a much greater role in explaining wages than do establishment-fixed components. This finding does not extend to agriculture, where the establishment-fixed component is equally important in terms of both relative variability and correlation with wages. Source: RAIS São Paulo state 1990s (prime-age workers in their highest-paying job). Wage levels relative to comparison-group wage levels from component estimates (table 8) . a Relative to worker with some or complete high school education, controlling for occupation. b Relative to non-skill-intensive blue-collar occupations, controlling for education. c Female relative to male workers, controlling for education and occupation. Table 11 reports components of log annual wage inequality in 1990 across sectors. Worker characteristics account for 50% of log wage variation in manufacturing but predict a considerably smaller portion of the variability in nonmanufacturing sectors, ranging from 35% in services to 26% in agriculture. Individual components among the worker characteristics matter to different degrees across sectors. Most notably, the commerce sector exhibits only negligible gender inequality.
B. Components of Individual Wages
C. Decomposition of Wage Inequality
In parallel with our findings on wage components, the establishment-fixed components in manufacturing, services, and commerce account for comparably small proportions of wage inequality, while this component is much more important in agriculture. For services and commerce, the smaller role of the worker-characteristics component is tied to the greater importance of the residual component. Note that the overall explanatory power of observed worker characteristics and the establishment fixed effect, as measured by the goodness-of-fit R 2 , is considerably lower in services, commerce, and agriculture than in manufacturing (table 8) . This corresponds to the lower overall explanatory power of the individual compensation model (1) for these sectors.
VIII. Discussion
A. Broad Comparisons
Our analysis uncovers a rich pattern of differences and similarities between the wage structures of Brazil, France, and the United States. The most noticeable differences are the familiar ones: both wage inequality and returns to education are much greater in Brazil. More surprising are the similarities. Brazil and France exhibit closely comparable occupational premia, and the compensation of workers based on their observable characteristics relates in a similar way to firm size, capital intensity, and skill intensity. In the United States, occupational premia are considerably smaller, and the relationships between wages and firm attributes are weaker. On the other hand, returns to human capital are lowest in France, and the gender gap is greatest.
High levels of wage inequality in developing versus industrialized countries are of great concern to economists and policymakers. These differences are especially pronounced for the case of Brazil. Our results offer insights into the factors underlying high Brazilian wage inequality. Wage variability based on observable worker characteristics, as a percentage of overall wage variability, is roughly equivalent across the three countries. Moreover, the correlation of log wages with the worker-characteristics component of wages is highest in Brazil. These findings indicate that much of the difference in wage inequality can be traced to compensation of workers based on their observable characteristics.
The picture is strikingly different with respect to the establishment-specific component of wages, controlling for worker characteristics. Variability of wages at the establishment level, in absolute terms, is roughly equal across the three countries, meaning that establishmentlevel factors explain a much smaller percentage of Brazilian inequality compared with the other countries. Thus, factors operating at the establishment level cannot account for the greater wage inequality observed in Brazil. The relatively weak correlation between log wages and the establishment component of wages in Brazil further highlight the low explanatory power of establishmentlevel influences.
B. Institutional Factors
Institutional comparisons across the three countries offer a measure of insight into these findings. Labor markets are heavily regulated in Brazil and France, and much less regulated in the United States. Botero et al. (2004) , for example, place France among the countries with the highest index of employment regulation, while Brazil occupies an intermediate position, and the United States belongs to the group of countries with few laws governing the cost of working times, dismissal procedures, and similar labor market characteristics. The countries are equivalently ordered with respect to collective relations legislation, with French laws greatly influencing the negotiations between firms and Source: RAIS São Paulo state 1990 (prime-age workers in their highest-paying job). Inequality index: squared coefficient of deviation (Shorrocks, 1982) , based on estimation samples. a Regression constant for OLS.
unions, and the United States relegating the bargaining process to the private sector. As Botero et al. (2004) argue, similarities between Brazil and France might be traceable to the fact that the Brazilian legislation derives from the French civil law, which spread to the rest of Europe through the Napoleonic conquest, and was then brought to Brazil via Portuguese colonization. In addition, Brazil's 1988 Constitution introduced a series of reforms to labor market institutions that aimed to increase workers' benefits and the right to organize, significantly raising labor costs. 22 Our results are suggestive as to the effects of labor market regulation on wages. Regulatory similarities between Brazil and France are paralleled by similarities in compensation tied to workers' occupations and characteristics of establishments. Thus, the regulatory environment may be an important determinant of cross-country differences with respect to occupational and establishment-level compensation. Disparities in returns to human capital between Brazil and France, as well as wage gaps based on gender, may be less sensitive to regulation. Similarly, regulation may matter less for overall wage variability based on worker characteristics and residual factors, where Brazil stands closer to the United States than to France.
C. Theoretical Implications
Our decomposition of wage variability into worker characteristics and establishment-fixed components captures the relative explanatory power of worker-based as opposed to establishment-based explanatory factors. Notably, observable worker characteristics account for about half of earnings inequality in Brazilian manufacturing, whereas factors operating at the establishment level, including those tied directly to the establishment and those related to establishment averages of unmeasured workforce characteristics, explain roughly 10%. The remaining 40% is associated with unmeasured worker attributes.
These findings have direct implications for theoretical approaches to wage determination. A wide range of theories predicts that features of the industry or firm may exert strong influences on wage structure, after taking account of worker characteristics. Such features include compensating differentials, efficiency wages, rent sharing, unionization, and trade exposure. Theories have also tied firm size and factor intensity, including worker skill intensity, to the wage structure. 23 Since differences in wages across industries and firms derive from wage variability among constituent establishments, our decomposition implies that these employerrelated theories can account for at most a tenth of overall wage variability. In addition, since Brazil, France, and the United States exhibit roughly equivalent establishmentlevel wage variability in absolute terms, employer-based theories cannot account for the high degree of inequality in Brazil relative to the other countries.
Competitive labor market theories predict that worker attributes command equal compensation across establishments. Observed attributes, including human capital, occupation, and gender, explain roughly half of Brazilian wage inequality, while unobserved attributes account for twofifths. These unobserved attributes may include intrinsic ability, school quality, family background, geographic mobility, and unmeasured determinants of health and education investment. 24 Cross-country differences in residual wage inequality may be quite sensitive to such worker-related factors.
In summary, our findings suggest that labor supply factors warrant the most attention among the explanations for high wage inequality. Labor demand factors deserve less attention, since their potential explanatory power is limited. For future research into compensation variation, expanded information about worker attributes, including social and geographic factors, would appear to have great potential for enhancing the understanding of wage structure.
IX. Conclusion
Using a comprehensive linked employer-employee data set for a developing country, we provide estimates for key elements of the Brazilian wage structure that permit direct comparisons with estimates of Abowd et al. (2001) for France and the United States. We confirm some familiar differences, but notably uncover numerous important similarities, particularly for Brazil and France. Our most important finding is that Brazil's high wage inequality cannot be explained by factors operating at the firm or industry level. Explanations must be sought in the characteristics of workers, both observable and unobservable.
Beyond our purpose of contrasting Brazil's wage structure with other countries, an extension of our data and methods to periods before and after Brazil's procompetitive reforms may prove useful for understanding the effects of Brazil's policy 22 The 1988 reforms reduced the maximum working hours per week from 48 to 44, increased the minimum overtime premium from 20% to 50%, reduced the maximum number of hours in a continuous shift from eight to six hours, increased maternity leave from three to four months, increased the value of paid vacations from 1 to 4/3 of the normal monthly wage, and increased the fine for an unjustified dismissal from 10% to 40% of the employer-funded severance pay account (FGTS). See Heckman and Pagés (2004) and Gonzaga (2003) for further details.
23 Rosen (1986) discusses compensating differentials. Links between trade and wage structure in Brazil are assessed in Gonzaga, MenezesFilho, and Terra (2006) . Arbache (2001) and Velenchik (1997) provide brief overviews of the literature on other industry-and firm-based explanatory factors.
24 Willis (1986) surveys competitive theories of wage determination based on worker attributes. On school quality and family background, see Behrman and Birdsall (1983) and Lam and Schoeni (1993) , respectively. Other factors are discussed in Behrman (1999). shifts. Numerous studies have tracked the effects of Brazil's trade reform on wages, for instance. 25 The availability of linked RAIS data allows wage effects to be separated into worker and establishment influences, and workers to be traced across jobs. Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2007) consider implications of trade for employment flows using RAIS and find that Brazil's tariff reductions significantly accelerate worker transitions out of the formal sector, while exporting firms and comparativeadvantage sectors fail to absorb displaced workers for several years. Extending this investigation to wage effects of trade would be of interest. Evidence in this paper suggests that impacts of reforms on the wage dispersion may be especially pronounced if they affect the compensation of worker characteristics.
APPENDIX A
Worker Data
Screening
Workers in RAIS are identified by the individual-specific PIS number (Programa de Integração Social) . A given establishment may report the same PIS multiple times within a single year so that the worker can withdraw from the employer-funded severance pay account (FGTS) through spurious layoffs and rehires. Bad compliance can cause certain PIS numbers to be recorded incorrectly or repeatedly. To handle these issues, we screen the sample as follows: (i) Observations with faulty PIS numbers (having fewer than eleven digits) are eliminated. We suspect short PIS numbers to be due to faulty bookkeeping. (ii) As mentioned in the text, observations with workers not employed on December 31st are removed; only the worker's job observation on December 31st with the highest annual average wage level is retained (in cases of ties, we randomly drop all but one job observation per worker on December 31st). This makes our sample comparable to Abowd et al. (2001) , who consider full-time and full-year employees. (iii) Observations of workers older than 50 years are dropped to avoid potential confounding effects stemming from workers who leave the labor force prior to official retirement age.
Compensation
RAIS defines the average monthly wage as the arithmetic mean of all monthly remunerations for a given worker, divided by the value of the minimum wage that prevails during the respective month. In this conversion, RAIS counts only the months, or parts thereof, during which the workers are employed, excluding the "thirteenth salary," which is a special December payment made in some sectors. Months with missing wage information are disregarded in the calculation of this mean.
The RAIS manual for respondents states explicitly the forms of payment that are considered valid components of the monthly wage rate. Among other components, these include salaries; extraordinary additions, supplements, and bonuses; tips and gratuities; commissions and fees; contracted premia; overtime compensation for contracted extra hours; hazard compensation; executive compensation; cost reimbursement components if they exceed 50% of the base salary and are for travel or transfers necessary for the execution of the job; payments for periods of vacation, holidays, and parental leave; vacation gratuities if they exceed twenty days of salary; piece wages; and in-kind remunerations such as room and board. As a rule, components are considered part of salary if they are taxable income or are subject to Brazilian social security contributions.
Payments that are not considered wage components include severance payments for layoffs; indemnity payments for permanent maternal leave and any other indemnity payments; so-called "family payments" under Brazilian labor law; vacation gratuities if they do not exceed twenty days of salary; additional social security compensation due to a worker's illness; moving expenses; travel cost reimbursements if they do not exceed 50% of the base salary; scholarships for interns; meals, equipment, and clothing for execution of the job; and participation in the employer's profits.
Experience, Education, and Occupation
Tables A1-A4 present age and education classifications from RAIS, along with the imputed ages used in construction of the potential experience variable. We use the age range information in our version of RAIS to infer the "typical" age of a worker in the age range (see table A1). We group age information in PNAD into the same categories and also ignore workers of age 50 and older.
To calculate potential labor force experience, we use the inference schedule shown in table A2 to impute the worker's age at the completion of his or her education for both RAIS and PNAD data. Table A2 also shows how we translate years of education in PNAD into the RAIS education categories.
Following Abowd et al. (2001) , we define potential labor market experience for a worker as the imputed age for his or her age category minus the imputed age for his or her education category.
The occupation indicator variables are obtained from the CBO classification codes in the RAIS, as reclassified to conform with the ISCO-88 categories (Muendler et al., 2004 ). Before we convert CBO to ISCO-88, we reset unknown CBO codes in RAIS at the four-digit level to the nearest applicable miscellaneous occupation category at the four-digit level. The mapping between ISCO-88 categories and occupation levels is given in table A3.
Finally, we define the education indicator variables as shown in table A4. In order to withdraw micro-level data from PIA at the Brazilian census bureau IBGE, we randomly tabulate cells of three (to five) firms. Some so-created cells contain firms for which we do not have RAIS observations or for which we cannot predict establishment-level information within RAIS. Our random aggregation routine leaves some PIA firms unassigned to cells in certain years in order to create random cells of three firms that appear possibly many consecutive years during other periods between 1990 and 1998. For both reasons, we lose further firms.
APPENDIX C
Complementary Household Survey Data
We use Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD) to observe formally and informally employed workers in São Paulo state in September 1990 and September 1997. We exclude both unemployed persons and employers, and obtain 13,665 PNAD household-level observations of workers in 1990 and 14,414 observations in 1997. Similar to our procedure for December wages in RAIS, we convert September wages in PNAD first to December values in Brazilian currency (using the Brazilian CPI Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor, INPC) and then into current U.S. dollars. 26 The PNAD household data permit the distinction between formal employment (with a labor ID card carteira) and informal employment (without labor ID card). Informal employment is recorded in PNAD if it entails at least four paid hours per week. The labor ID card entitles workers to employment protection and social benefits, largely borne by the employer.
APPENDIX D
Summary Statistics
Tables D1 and D2 provide sample means and standard deviations of worker-sample variables. 26 While INPC inflation was 59.4% between September and December 1990, the exchange rate devalued by 101.9% over the same period. To avoid distortions from exchange rate fluctuations in our comparisons, we first transform PNAD September wages to December values using the Brazilian CPI INPC. 
